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 Criminalisation and  
Normative Theory 
David Brown* 
Abstract 
Criminal law scholarship is enjoying a renaissance in normative theory, evident in a 
growing list of publications from leading scholars that attempt to elucidate a set of 
principles on which criminalisation and criminal law might — indeed should — be based. 
This development has been less marked in Australia, where a stream of criminologically 
influenced criminal law scholarship, teaching and practice has emerged over nearly three 
decades. There are certain tensions between this predominantly contextual, process-
oriented and criminological tradition that has emerged in Australia, characterised by a 
critical approach to the search for ‘general principles’ of the criminal law, and the more 
recent revival of interest in developing a set of principles on which a ‘normative theory of 
criminal law’ might be founded. Aspects of this tension will be detailed through 
examination of recent examples of criminalisation in New South Wales that are broadly 
representative of trends across all Australian jurisdictions. The article will then reflect on 
the links between these particular features of criminalisation and attempts to develop a 
‘normative theory’ of criminalisation. 
Developing a criminologically influenced tradition of criminal law 
scholarship in Australia 
A developing tradition of Australian contextual, process-oriented and criminologically 
influenced criminal law scholarship and teaching practice has unfolded over nearly three 
decades and is reflected in the leading New South Wales teaching text, Criminal Laws, 
begun in 1984, with the first edition in 1990 and most recent (5th) in 2011 (Brown et al 
2011). The ‘organising principles’ for this collective project,1 as set down in 1984 in 
preparation for the first edition, included: a questioning of the assumptions that ‘criminal 
laws are the only or the main form of social and legal regulation — that the choice is 
between criminal prohibition or no regulation at all’; that ‘criminal law’ is a discrete and 
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 unified area of law’; and that ‘there are general principles which run the breadth of the 
criminal law and logically (or at least consistently) determine the structure of its rules’.2 
The developing tradition originated in an attempt to reorient criminal law scholarship and 
teaching away from a hitherto heavily doctrinal approach based on elucidating the ‘general 
principles’ of criminal law drawn from an examination of appellate decisions in homicide, 
sexual assault and larceny, to a contextual, process-oriented and criminologically influenced 
approach that expanded the field to take in drugs offences, public order offences, criminal 
process, criminalisation and sentencing. The orientation of this movement3 was to 
emphasise the links between substantive law and process, to focus far more on policing, pre-
trial decision-making, and the lower courts, and to draw heavily on socio-legal, criminal 
justice and criminological materials; in short, to develop a criminologically literate criminal 
law scholarship, teaching and practice. One of the conditions of this movement was the 
location of criminology in the Australian context predominantly within law schools, rather 
than within sociology or separate criminology departments, as was the case in the United 
Kingdom. While this may have retarded theoretical development and the ‘characteristic 
posture of transcendent vision seeking adopted as part of the repertoire of critical exercises’ 
(Meredith 1993:228), another consequence, for both criminology and criminal law teaching 
and scholarship in Australia, has been a more engaged and practical involvement in criminal 
justice campaigns, social movements and law reform commissions, and a more politicised, 
contextual and criminologically informed criminal law pedagogy. (On the engaged character 
of Australian critical criminology, see Brown 2002:96–101.) 
 A key element of the tradition has been a commitment to an analysis of the processes of 
criminalisation prior to any examination of specific offence areas. The ‘criminalisation’ 
chapter has, across five editions, contained extracts and commentary emphasising the 
historical and cultural contingency of crime; the role of traditional criteria such as morality, 
harm, offensiveness, and the public/private distinction in the processes of criminalisation; 
along with the importance of social reaction (such as moral panics), the ‘overreach’ of the 
criminal law, and the increasing importance of various forms of regulation and 
governmentality (Brown et al 2011:41–114). The recent works of scholars such as Ashworth 
(2009), Lacey (2009, 2012, 2012a), Duff (2007), Husak (2008) and Zedner (2007, 2008) 
have prompted a new section in the fifth edition entitled ‘Normative Theories of 
Criminalisation’. Since then, further normative work on the appropriate principles of 
criminalisation has emerged, such as Simester and von Hirsch (2011), Zedner and Roberts 
(2012), Duff and Green (2011), and Duff et al (2010, 2012). 
There are certain tensions between a predominantly contextual, process-oriented and 
criminological tradition that has, in a post-structuralist vein, pursued a critical approach to 
the search for ‘general principles’ of the criminal law, and the more recent revival of interest 
in developing a set of principles on which a ‘normative theory of criminal law’ might be 
founded. Key aspects of those tensions — the status of criminal law and criminalisation as 
unitary objects or fields, the unproductive division between ‘critical’ and ‘normative’, and 
the need for wider integration of criminology, penology and other disciplines with criminal 
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law — will be discussed before moving to examine recent features of criminalisation in 
New South Wales (cf Loughnan 2010). 
Criminal law and criminalisation as unitary objects or fields 
The Australian ‘contextual approach’4 has questioned the notion of criminal law, its 
institutions, processes and practices, as constituting a unity possessing an essence or 
manifesting ‘a single social function’ (Hirst and Jones 1987:22). The processes of 
criminalisation and the power to punish have been approached in specific contexts as 
particular forms of social calculation, in the belief that what are essentially different forms 
of regulation will continue to be developed by policy-makers under the broad label of 
‘criminal law’ and that it will be increasingly difficult to identify ‘general principles’ 
underlying all criminal offences. Having said that, and despite scepticism at the possibility 
of developing a normative theory of criminal law through the agency of moral philosophy, 
rather than sociological critique and empirical analysis, the attempt to establish a set of 
normative principles that generally should be taken into account in decisions to criminalise 
particular forms of behaviour, as part of an exercise to combat ‘over-criminalisation’ and 
promote debate over the appropriate limits of the criminal law, has been broadly supported. 
However, as Lacey notes, there are a number of difficulties besetting such an enterprise, 
including the lack of conceptual tools and empirical knowledge to ‘underpin even the initial 
assertion about “overcriminalisation”’ (Lacey 2009:941); the dangers of slippage between 
the ‘conceptual, the empirical and the normative’ (2009:944); the importance of 
distinguishing between criminalisation as outcome and criminalisation as a social practice 
(2009:950); and the suggestion that ‘from a sociological point of view, the proposition that 
criminalisation is a sufficiently unitary phenomenon to form a distinct object of inquiry is 
seriously problematic’ (2009:950): 
[W]e must avoid the prevailing tendency to slip unconsciously between claims about formal 
and substantive criminalisation; to promote normative claims as if they had no institutional or 
political conditions of existence; and to make generalisations which make no reference to the 
existing empirical or historical position which would give them substance (Lacey 2009:960). 
To accept that what we know as ‘criminal law and process’ encompasses a number of 
different forms of regulation is not to accept the appropriateness of any particular form as a 
method of responding to particular behaviour. Nor is it to be confined to description, 
rendered incapable of making normative claims as to the principles that should guide the 
making of choices about the appropriateness of particular regulatory options and their 
specific form, both within the criminal law and its linked regulatory civil, administrative and 
contractual hybrids. Certainly, if we assume that criminal law and criminalisation are 
unitary objects or fields, the formulation of a rational, coherent, logical, and just set of 
normative principles governing the decision to define certain conduct as criminal and 
specifying the form such offences should take, is a clearer, more certain enterprise. If, 
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 however, on the basis of descriptive and empirical evidence, we call that assumption into 
question, then the task becomes a murkier, more uncertain one. Borders become fluid or 
blurred, or dissolve, pragmatic questions and issues as to investigation and enforcement 
practices, the way specific offences are constituted and defined in practice and translated 
into forms of evidence and procedure through policing, pre-trial and court processes, come 
to the fore. Empirical studies in a socio-legal or criminological mode become more 
important and necessary to provide detailed context and to map likely effects of particular 
choices. Normative decisions of what ‘ought to be done’ are then made on the basis of 
pragmatic assessments of likely and actual effects, rather than on the basis of the flow-
through of some foundational principle. To some working within a philosophical or 
jurisprudential tradition, this ‘criminological’ or ‘socio-legal’ approach can seem chaotic, 
instrumental, relativist and unprincipled. This article will argue otherwise. 
Beyond ‘crits’ v ‘normatives’  
Nicola Lacey embarks on an elegant discussion of two approaches to what she calls 
‘criminal law theory’: ‘critique’ and ‘the philosophy of the criminal law’ (Lacey 1998). 
Philosophical theories of criminal law she takes to be those broadly represented by Anthony 
Duff, which seek to elaborate upon the principled nature of criminal law. Critical theory, in 
contrast, represented in the work of Alan Norrie, questions the assumptions about 
‘rationality, coherence and systematicity as features of and ideals for both theory itself and 
criminal law doctrine’ (Lacey 1998:10). Lacey quotes Norrie’s statement, ‘if the philosophy 
of punishment is essentially contradictory in its forms, and if these forms are based upon 
legal ideology, then it ought to be possible to understand not only the philosophy of 
punishment but also the theory and practice of the criminal law as contradictory’, as at the 
core of the critical position. Her conclusion after a careful review is to suggest that:  
[P]hilosophical analysis which does not answer some of the demands of critical method 
constitutes an intellectual practice which has little to do with criminal legal practices or, 
indeed, with any practice other than itself. Conversely, … the view of what counts as 
‘rationality’ or ‘coherence’ taken by many critics is both unduly narrow and inappropriately 
abstract, with the result that their own position turns out to be unsatisfactory in a curiously 
similar way to that of their ‘philosophical’ opponents (Lacey 1998:11). 
The Australian contextual approach, as represented by Criminal Laws (2011), has been 
closer to the ‘critical’ than the ‘philosophical’ camp. In particular, a central methodological 
approach has been that there is no ‘external’ vantage point from which to offer descriptions 
or theories of practice, because knowledge does not stand outside and above the institutional 
practices through which it is produced. As Russell Hogg notes, ‘crime is not external to the 
practices of criminal justice: we are only enabled to know it through these practices’ (Hogg 
1983:9). Or as Lacey puts it: 
‘[T]heories of criminal law’, whether written by or for philosophers or lawyers, are inevitably 
interpretations of social practices whose practitioners themselves have interpretations which 
are an object of the theorisation. The implication is that ‘at large’ philosophising which is not 
addressed to any particular system or practice of criminal law is, like a map of imaginary 
terrain, not an exercise in criminal law theory but rather an exercise in philosophising itself. It 
may be a stimulating intellectual or an engaging aesthetic exercise, but it is not one which 
particularly claims the attention of those interested in criminal law any more than the 
imaginary map claims the attention of an explorer with a particular journey in mind (Lacey 
1998:16). 
Leading normative theorist Anthony Duff makes a similar point when he argues that ‘to 
deny the possibility of a priori normative theorizing is not to deny the possibility of rational 
normative theorizing: it is rather (or should be) to insist that such theorizing is possible and 
intelligible only within some human practice’ (Duff 2005:364). 
However, there has not been a self-conscious adherence to a ‘critical’ standpoint in the 
Australian contextual approach. There has been a similar motivation to expose injustice in 
the ‘normal’ functioning of criminal justice, apparent in the work of leading critical theorist, 
Andrew Norrie (Norrie 2001, 2005). But there has been a tendency for work such as 
Norrie’s to end up substituting a principle of necessary non-coherence for the philosophers’ 
constant reworking of doctrinal principle in the name of analytic coherence (Duff, 
2005:358), in part because of a tendency to assert or assume an underlying logic of 
repressive functions to the criminal law. In contrast, the Australian contextual approach has 
followed Hogg’s early suggestion that: 
[A] fruitful avenue for research in the future must reject the search for an adequate theory or 
model of criminal justice as an organised system which might be represented in a particular 
field of knowledge with identifiable boundaries. In its place inquiry might take the form of an 
investigation of practices which produce and organise this knowledge. If the system of 
criminal justice is a social construction then the way to proceed if we are to change it, is not by 
imposing some logic upon it from above, which in turn serves to bolster it, but by dissecting it 
from below: to analyse the practices which constitute it as a field of power, their sources, 
effects, and the myriad networks of power and knowledge they enter (Hogg 1983:12). 
Integrating criminology, penology, criminal justice into criminal law 
scholarship: Adverse to normative theorising? 
Within this approach, considerable emphasis has been placed on integrating criminological, 
criminal justice and penological perspectives and research with criminal law. One of the 
major limitations of much criminal law theory, whether of the ‘critique’ or 
‘philosophical/normative’ genre, is its tendency to derive the appropriate formulations for 
criminal law from an analysis of the logical, moral and ethical coherence or desirability of 
various theories, principles and ideas, with little recourse to sociological, criminological and 
criminal justice research studies and empirical evidence as to the relationship between the 
discursive and non-discursive aspects of criminal justice practices. A prime example of this 
is in the area of sentencing, where so much of the debate, as Garland pointed out long ago, 
assumes that ‘moral philosophy is the most appropriate means of evaluating penal practice’, 
which in turn entails ‘a conception of penality as a moral object’ and of punishment as mere 
negation: 
[S]ocial institutions such as penal sanctions find it difficult to confine themselves to the realm 
of philosophical negativity. They insist on materiality, substance, and positive significance. 
They involve definite techniques, practices, knowledges, objectives and ideologies, all of 
which carry definite social and political implications and clearly require to be evaluated, 
criticised, or justified in a detailed and concrete manner (Garland 1983:82; see also Garland 
and Young 1983). 
Garland’s point is a key one, often overlooked in the interminable debates in moral 
philosophy over the justifications for punishment. It is an analysis that legal philosophers 
would benefit from revisiting. Moreover, it applies as well to the operations of criminal law, 
constituted as they are by the practices, sensibilities and habitus of a range of criminal 
justice agencies and organisations, often grouped together under the label ‘criminal justice 
system’. While this is a shorthand term of some utility, its use tends to promote the notion 
that these agencies and actors: public, police, prosecutors, lawyers, judiciary and corrections 
workers are operating a unified system in pursuit of an agreed and uncontradictory set of 
 principles and aims. The implausibility of this can be seen in the slippage between judicial 
comments on sentence as to (the contradictory) factors of retribution, deterrence, remorse, 
rehabilitation and so on, and the actual lived experience of imprisonment by the person 
sentenced. The lived sentence, shot through as it is with physical and emotional privation, is 
governed largely through risk-based managerialism, manifested in a variety of programs 
currently organised around the concept of ‘criminogenic needs’, access to and engagement 
with which affect both the possibility of any sort of coherent ‘pathway’ through or narrative 
of the ‘meaning’ of a sentence, and the likelihood of being granted parole and thus the 
determination of an estimated release date (Hall 2013). 
This is more than just a point about the necessity for normative theory to grapple with the 
empirical. It is a theoretical point that an adequate analysis of the criminal law and of the 
principles that might desirably guide its constitution and operation cannot be derived solely 
from an exercise in moral philosophy. The network and complex of criminal justice and 
penal practices cannot, as Garland notes, be adequately understood as simply ‘philosophy-in 
action’ or ‘materialised morality’ (Garland 1983:83) for politics, policing, the operation of 
law in the court process, are all semi-autonomous domains that have their own conditions of 
existence, rationalities, institutional means, technologies, languages, practices and limits that 
cannot be reduced to the realisation of any particular moral philosophy or principle of law, 
nor rendered amenable and ruly through the dictates of reason. 
Another example of slippage between supposedly agreed-upon principle and any sort of 
concrete analysis is the familiar trope that while ‘marginal’ areas, such as public order 
offences, may be contentious, we can all agree on the central categories of murder, rape and 
theft. But can we? Even the most ‘categorical’ of wrongs ‘such as murder and other kinds of 
serious physical assaults, rape, attacks on property’ that it ‘would be hard to imagine not 
being criminal in any legal system’ (Duff 2007:143) become somewhat less ‘categorical’ as 
soon as empirical and contextual evidence is admitted. In relation to murder, for example, 
does this include deaths on unsafe worksites, or from workplace asbestos inhalation, from 
smoking tobacco, from pollution, neglect, failure to render assistance, police killings, 
euthanasia, deaths in custody, deaths caused by omissions, deaths caused by state or 
corporate action, killings by householders in defence of their property, deaths occasioned 
where provocation and self-defence are argued, and so on? 
Similarly, certain legal philosophers discuss rape/sexual assault at a high level of 
abstraction as a core example of a pure moral wrong clearly warranting criminalisation on 
any normative theory. Yet, in practice, despite decades of feminist agitation and law reform, 
there is still a marked reluctance to report sexual assaults, the rates of filtering out of 
complaints by the police and decisions not to prosecute by the Director of Public 
Prosecutions are high, conviction rates are low and the prospects of success on appeal for 
those few who are convicted are good. Repeat perpetrators in institutions (for example, 
sections of the church, orphanages and welfare homes) have been sheltered and protected 
for decades, sent off to other locations to repeat their depredations when their activities 
finally attracted too much attention. All of this indicates moral ambiguity, rather than 
consensus, the limitations of a reliance on criminal law to promote bodily integrity, and the 
difficulties involved in doing so where vulnerability becomes licence and cultural narratives 
of sexual desire and availability can be constructed in the flimsiest of garb, and read as 
implicit in even the most coercive of circumstances, both within legal culture and process 
and in the broader community. 
Ngaire Naffine uses the low levels of reporting, prosecution and conviction to challenge 
the usefulness and legitimacy of ignoring the ‘mundane and worrying realities’ (Naffine 
2009:232). She argues that ‘criminal law theory does not serve us well when it is 
preoccupied with pure rights and wrongs and Platonic forms, which bear little relation to 
actual current conventional ways of defining criminality and practically assigning (and 
failing to assign) blame’ (2009:231). Lacey argues that ‘an adequate theorisation of criminal 
law has to be more historically grounded, more informed by the insights of other disciplines, 
and more reflective about its own assumptions than is much criminal law theory in Britain 
and North America’ (Lacey 1998:11–12). Arguably, Australian contextual criminal law 
scholarship has, for some time, tended to range across doctrinal criminal law, criminal 
justice studies, criminology and penology.5 Lauterwein’s recent book-length treatment of 
the differences in approaches to the issue of the limits of criminal law between Germany and 
Australia sees the Australian criminological approach as having been inimical to the 
development of normative principles: 
In Australia, possible reasons for the criminalization of certain conduct are described, while no 
normative statements on the legitimacy of the reasons are made. This provides for a 
comprehensive analysis of the history and the politics of criminal law. 
In Germany, legitimate reasons for criminalization of conduct are established in order to make 
statements on the legitimacy of particular offences. This provides a framework for legislative 
critique.  
While the Australian approach aims to describe the politics of criminalization, the German one 
aims to influence these politics (Lauterwein 2010:118, emphasis in original). 
If we accept for a moment the initial characterisations of the two styles, the pragmatic 
question arises: Which of the approaches is most likely, empirically, to influence the 
processes and outcomes of criminalisation? It is not self-evident that the answer is a 
normative approach based on the declared function of criminal law being ‘the protection of 
legal goods/interests’, a function that then provides both a guide to statutory interpretation 
and a limiting principle restricting any criminalisation beyond the limits of this principle. 
This is no more self-evident than a criminologically influenced approach, which describes 
and unpacks the institutional and political conditions of the existence of the processes and 
outcomes of criminalisation, with a view to arguing in normative fashion how those 
conditions of existence might be changed to promote specified normative principles, to 
promote a ‘goal of normative legal theorizing’, as Lauterwein puts it, ‘influencing 
legislation and decision-making by the courts’ (Lauterwein 2010:119). The point is that this 
assessment cannot be made a priori; it depends on a detailed analysis of the particular 
historical, political, legal and cultural conditions of lawmaking and interpretation evident in 
significantly different polities. Local traditions, in Australia, for example, of common law 
pragmatism, of limited constitutionalism and the absence of a Bill of Rights, and of a 
predominantly part-time, practitioner-oriented, vocational legal education until the 1970s, 
are part of those conditions of existence.  
The fundamental difference of approach is that normative (or ‘jurisprudential’ per 
Lauterwein) legal theorists tend to look mainly to the internal rationality, logic, coherence, 
and justice of the desired normative principles. The sociological/criminological approach 
tends to reflect upon the political, legal and cultural conditions of existence of particular 
instances of criminalisation with a view to normative ends of influencing the promulgation, 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
5  Such is the ‘North Atlantic’ hegemony in this field that such Australian scholarship, and the sustained activist 
and engaged political and educational practice from which it emerges, have been largely ignored by the leading 
British and American scholars. For the ‘normatives’, it is ‘insufficiently theoretical’, read philosophical. For 
the ‘crits’ it is insufficiently ‘critical’,  read ‘theoretical’, and moreover takes legal doctrine seriously.  
 adoption and increased influence of specified principles; in particular, process rights of the 
type championed consistently by one normative theorist, Andrew Ashworth, which are often 
grouped under terms such as ‘due process’, the ‘right to a fair trial’ and ‘proportionality’. 
Ashworth’s work shows that these two broad approaches are not entirely mutually 
incompatible, particularly with the trend away from the more abstract type of legal 
philosophising in favour of a more contextualised ‘practical philosophy’ (Duff 2007:142–3). 
I will return to this point after an examination of some of the key features in the recent 
creation of new criminal offences in New South Wales. 
Key features in the recent creation of new criminal offences in New 
South Wales 
It might help focus the discussion to engage in an analysis of some of the key features of 
recent examples of criminal offence creation in New South Wales, features which arguably 
seem typical across a range of Australian jurisdictions. How and why are new offences 
created? What specific legal form do they take? (For a similar exercise see Loughnan 2010.) 
Five key features will be discussed:  
• The lack of reference to a set of desirable principles in decisions about 
criminalisation. 
• The role of law and order populism. 
• The linking of process and substantive law — new offences are linked to 
evidentiary and procedural changes and extensions of police powers. 
• The use of criminal penalties in regulatory fields — the expansion of hybrids 
and blending and blurring. 
• The increasing importance of risk prevention, precaution and ‘pre-crime’. 
The lack of reference to a set of desirable principles in decisions about 
criminalisation 
The first and most commonplace feature to note is that parliamentary debates, ministerial 
statements and second reading speeches rarely make any reference to a set of desirable 
principles governing the creation of new criminal offences of the sort suggested by Andrew 
Ashworth or Lord Williams. Ashworth quotes Lord Williams of Mostyn in response to a 
Parliamentary question about the basis of criminalisation. The answer was that criminal 
offences ‘should only be created when absolutely necessary’ and that: 
In considering whether new offences should be created, factors taken into account include 
whether: 
• the behaviour in question is sufficiently serious to warrant intervention by the 
criminal law; 
• the mischief could be dealt with under existing legislation or by using other 
remedies; 
• the proposed offence is enforceable in practice; 
• the proposed offence is tightly drawn and legally sound; 
• the proposed penalty is commensurate with the seriousness of the offence; 
• there is consistency across the sentencing framework (Ashworth 2000:229). 
 While noting the aspirational nature of this rare example, Ashworth remarks that a brief 
analysis of the criminal laws created in England in 1997 ‘suggests that the laws being 
enacted bear little relation to the government’s supposed principles’. He describes the con-
struction of criminal law as ‘unprincipled and chaotic’ and admits that any attempt to define 
criminal law in terms of its content is destined to fail. Criminal law is ‘not the product of 
any principled inquiry or consistent application of certain criteria, but [is] largely dependent 
on the fortunes of successive governments, on campaigns in the mass media, on the 
activities of various pressure groups, and so forth’ (Ashworth 2000:226). A similar 
characterisation is apt in Australia. While Parliamentary draftspersons have recourse to 
some established principles in drafting the wording of new criminal provisions — as clearly 
do specialist committees such as the Australian Model Criminal Code Officers Committee 
(‘MCCOC’) (see Brown et al 2011:34–7; Goode 2002, 2009; Leader-Elliott 2002; Bronnitt 
and Gani 2009) and the New South Wales Legislation Review Committee — such concerns 
are largely absent from political, media and even legislative debate over the appropriate 
limits of the criminal law. Particular criminal laws are increasingly the product of particular 
political campaigns, rather than the work of bodies of eminent lawyers concerned to ensure 
that individual offence definitions are in line with ‘general principles of criminal law’. 
Ashworth does not contend that criminal law is ‘grounded in a stable set of established 
doctrines’ (2003:v). He recognises that there is ‘ample evidence that the arguments and 
assumptions that influence the development of the law form a disparate group, sometimes 
conflicting and sometimes invoked selectively’ and that political factors often influence the 
shape of legislation (Ashworth 2003:v). He stakes this claim even more strongly later: ‘the 
boundaries of criminal law are explicable largely as the results of exercises of political 
power at particular points in history’ (Ashworth 2009:2). He goes on to note that: 
it is not argued or assumed here that there exists some objective benchmark of criminality, or 
some general theory which will enable us to tell whether or not certain conduct ought to be 
criminalized. The range of actual and potential crimes is so wide and varied that this seems 
unattainable (Ashworth 2009:22). 
The rise of law and order populism 
Periodisations can be dangerous, but I have elsewhere (Brown 2005:243–57) offered a 
rough one for criminal justice in New South Wales. From 1970 to the mid-1980s, a period 
of reform was driven largely by ‘progressive’ critiques of criminal justice practices seeking 
the restriction of police powers and the curbing of various violent, abusive and 
discriminatory criminal justice practices. This period was supplanted from the mid-1980s 
onwards by criminal justice reform driven by the rise of victim concerns, the increased 
politicisation and media exploitation of law and order culminating in the development of an 
‘uncivil politics of law and order’ (Hogg and Brown 1998) and a ‘new’ (Pratt et al 2005) or 
‘popular’ punitiveness (Pratt 2007) demanding increased police powers, restricted judicial 
discretion in sentencing and heavier penalties.  
The former period actually produced a number of decriminalisations in the area of public 
order offences: the abolition of vagrancy, begging, prostitution and public drunkenness as 
criminal offences and a liberalisation of offensive behaviour. The latter period saw a retreat 
on prostitution and offensive behaviour together with an unrelenting recourse to the criminal 
law to ‘solve’ crises of political legitimacy over law and order issues. The primary political 
imperative became that of being seen to manage crises and controversies; being seen to be 
‘doing something’ became more important than what was actually done and its effects. The 
easiest (rather than ‘toughest’) response was the familiar one of expressions of outrage over 
particular cases, coupled with promises of ‘tough’ action, usually in the form of a litany of 
 law and order ‘common sense’: more police, more powers, heavier penalties, and longer 
sentences (see generally Hogg and Brown 1998; Weatherburn 2004; Brown 2002a). In this 
mode, criminal law tends to be a symbolic gesture, offered as an immediate solution to 
social problems. A prime example of this general approach is the bidding war that regularly 
breaks out between all major political parties in the lead up to state and territory elections.  
One of the consequences of the ‘uncivil politics of law and order’ and ‘popular 
punitiveness’ for criminal justice policy is that a number of conditions necessary to promote 
a more principled approach to criminalisation are undermined. One is the tendency to 
sideline, bypass or ignore official Law Reform Commissions, Royal Commissions, the 
MCCOC or other ‘expert’ reports, judging them to be unresponsive to political imperatives 
that require instant responses to legitimation crises around particular cases. Another is the 
loss of credibility suffered by the judiciary, public service bureaucracy and academia in the 
face of a more general ‘anti-elites’ movement, expressing the rise of a ‘public voice’ 
challenging traditional forms of expert discourse (Ryan 2005; Loader 2006). 
Process changes: Extensions to police powers, procedure, the example of 
bail 
Criminalisation does not just involve the creation of new or amended substantive offences; it 
also involves changes to police powers and to the laws of evidence and criminal procedure. 
The relevance to the issue of criminalisation of extensions of police powers and changes to 
the laws of evidence and procedure is that such changes, of which there have been many in 
recent years, become significant factors in determining whether particular forms of 
behaviour are found to constitute specific criminal offences. 
A pertinent example of criminalisation through process involves the issue of bail, and the 
growth of remand in custody, a category comprising 23 per cent of all Australian prisoners 
(ABS 2012:14) and 25.7 per cent in New South Wales (ABS 2012:32). One outcome of the 
reform-oriented period in the 1960s and 1970s described above was the Bail Act 1978 
(NSW), which sought to make bail more available by moving from cash bail to 
recognisances and sureties and providing for a right to bail for summary offences and a 
presumption in favour of bail for all offences except armed robbery. In an indication of the 
hyper activity of the New South Wales legislature and the centrality of process issues to the 
electoral politics of law and order, there were 89 amending Acts between 1979 (when the 
Act came into force) and 2011, a 32-year period. Terminological changes accounted for 
41 of these Acts; 19 were machinery/process provisions, some of great significance such as 
s 22A, which limited bail applications to one. This technocratic, cost-saving change rapidly 
increased the remand population as lawyers deferred making bail applications for days and 
weeks until full instructions are obtained and the best application can be put forward. What 
Steel calls ‘punitive changes’ (Steel 2009:223) — alterations to the structure of the Act 
involving the whittling away of the presumption in favour of bail and creating a morass of 
exceptions to the presumption, no presumption, and presumptions against bail in relation to 
a wide range of offences — accounts for 26 separate pieces of legislation. Some of these 
changes, such as provisions in relation to domestic violence offences, followed research and 
detailed consideration, consultation and debate. Many stemmed from ad hoc short-term 
consideration after individual cases attracting media attention. Among the most significant 
changes were those removing the presumption in favour of bail for offenders with a record 
of property offences such as break and enter (Brown et al 2011:177–91; Booth and 
Townsley 2009; Stubbs 2010; NSWLRC 2012:ch 3). 
This is significant in terms of criminalisation as bail has ceased to be a mere procedural 
issue attached to the key concern of whether accused persons will attend court to answer the 
charges against them. It has become detached from this pre-trial location and function, and 
from the fundamental notions such as the ‘presumption of innocence’ and ‘no punishment 
without a due process finding of guilt’ supposedly governing them. Instead, it is now a free-
floating forum for vague risk assessments of whether the accused is thought likely to 
commit further offences of any type if granted bail. (Brown, 2013) Further, these vague 
assessments are based not solely on the individual’s criminal history, but in accordance with 
the Act, on inclusion in categories such as ‘repeat property offenders’.  
The precautionary principle and notions of ‘community protection’ have become vehicles 
for a massive pre-trial criminalisation and punishment of the yet-to-be-convicted, a process 
of de facto preventive detention, dwarfing in numbers the limited schemes for preventive 
detention of serious sex offenders now in operation across five states, which account for 166 
community supervision or detentions orders in total (Baldry et al 2011). 
The expanding scope of criminal law: Civil, administrative and contractual 
hybrids: Blending and blurring 
Criminal law is increasingly characterised by a move from the still-dominant image of 
common law general principles, the presumption of mens rea, and the burden of proof on the 
prosecution, to the actuality of an increasing swathe of statutory offences created by 
legislatures. These statutory offences found liability in strict terms, either minimising fault 
elements or restricting them to defences of honest and reasonable mistake of fact that must 
be made out at an evidentiary level by the defence. Traditional criminal legal doctrine 
constructs a free-willed, intentional, rational, choosing, responsible, individual subject: a 
subject morally suitable for punishment. Governmental power operates upon a subject 
constituted as a member of a designated and variable population requiring regulation, 
information and choice, whether as motorist, pedestrian, consumer, parent, student etc; a 
subject for whom the moral basis for penalty lies in the failure to comply with norms 
formulated for the efficient and safe functioning of various collective activities and 
enterprises. Sovereign power fabricates the free-willed individual as legal subject; neo-
liberal governmental power fabricates members of a particular population in need of 
regulation in their own and society’s interest, as subjects of governance. 
It is not difficult to find examples of the vastly different sorts of regulation that nominally 
find a unity under the rubric of the criminal law, but more aptly illustrate the blurring of 
forms, agents, techniques, and results of regulation. For example, where there is alcohol-
related violence in public settings, we find a wide range of responses. In terms of 
prosecutions, there is a mix of traditional criminal law prosecutions of patrons for assault, 
offensive behaviour, resisting arrest and malicious damage, and a much smaller number of 
prosecutions of operators of licensed premises for breaches of liquor laws. There is a regime 
of predominantly welfare-based ‘detention’ of ‘intoxicated persons’ rather than the former 
police arrest for drunkenness. Increasingly, at the forefront in the attempt to grapple with 
some of the damaging social effects of the deregulation of licensing hours is the introduction 
of ‘responsible server programs’, the monitoring of police reports of assaults in and around 
specific licenced venues by the New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics, and the 
publication of a list of the most problematic venues. Licensing authorities have acted on this 
information by restricting hours of opening and closing and requiring the withdrawal of 
glasses in favour of plastic cups. Sydney City Council has prepared a late-night 
Development Control Plan aimed at curtailing alcohol-related violence. Some licensed 
venues have introduced requirements for identity cards and, in some venues, forms of 
 telemetric identification of patrons, for proof of age and also to exclude known 
troublemakers. There has been a major expansion in private security guards operating not 
only inside and outside but also in the streets around licensed premises. Price regulation 
through increased taxation of certain types of drinks popular with young people (such as 
‘alcopops’) has been introduced. Proposals have been made for increased availability of late 
night public transport from high-risk night-time economy areas. The above notes just some 
of the developments (for a case study on the varied reaction to a killing in the Kings Cross 
entertainment precinct, see Quilter 2013). 
What we tend to see is a mishmash, a blurring of forms, agents, subjects and modes of 
regulation and power. The blurring of criminal, civil and administrative in the regulatory 
area is highlighted by the Australian Law Reform Commission (‘ALRC’), where it noted 
that: 
The traditional dichotomy between criminal and non-criminal procedures and penalties no 
longer accurately describes the modern position, if it ever did. The functions and purposes of 
civil, administrative and criminal penalties overlap in several respects. Even some procedural 
aspects, such as the different standards of proof for civil and criminal sanctions, are not always 
clearly distinguishable (ALRC 2002:2.91). 
In a project for this paper, Acts containing criminal offences judged by the use of 
criminal penalties, passed by the New South Wales Parliament over a three-year period from 
2008–10 were collected. In 2008, there were 46 separate New South Wales Acts creating 
criminal offences (new and amended); in 2009 there were 40 Acts; in 2010 there were 
42 Acts; a total of 128 pieces of legislation over the three years 2008–10. In 2008, 10 out of 
the 46 separate Acts covered what might be called ‘traditional’ criminal conduct — roughly 
22 per cent. The other three-quarters covered a wide range of fields running the regulatory 
alphabet, from adoption to workers’ compensation. Many of these offences (72 per cent) 
provide for punishment by penalty units (fines); some provide terms of imprisonment (28 
per cent). Only around one-quarter of the individual Acts concern traditional criminal law 
subject matter. The vast majority involve criminal penalties imposed in a wide range of 
regulatory activities. 
‘Pre-emption’, ‘pre-crime’ and precaution 
A traditional doctrinal question relating to the limits of criminal law has been about how far 
a person has to go along the path to committing what will ultimately be a completed 
criminal offence before society is entitled to intervene on the basis that he or she has 
attempted to commit the offence. Traditionally, the position has been that an attempt should 
in itself be a criminal offence, but this has been mediated by the principle that mere acts of 
preparation fall short of an attempt, and lie outside the limits of criminal law. The Criminal 
Code (Cth) s 11.1(2) provides that, for the person to be guilty of attempt, his or her ‘conduct 
must be more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence’. A significant 
rationale for this is that those considering embarking on criminal activity should have an 
opportunity to repent before things go too far. This principled distinction between non-
criminal acts of preparation and criminal attempts, while formally intact, has been 
undermined increasingly by Parliamentary activity (see generally Brown et al 2011:985–
1074). To give one example, in New South Wales those who agree to supply drugs or offer 
to supply them are guilty of actually supplying them, even if they have never had any in 
their possession nor indeed any intention of ultimately supplying a drug (Drug Misuse and 
Trafficking Act 1985 (NSW) s 3(1)). 
Lucia Zedner has charted a ‘pre-emptive turn’, the shift to a ‘pre-crime society’ (Zedner 
2007:261), where association is criminalised without a requirement to prove that a specific 
criminal offence has been committed or is even planned. While pre-emptive criminalisation 
has a long history in the form of consorting laws (Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 546A) and 
offences such as possessing implements of housebreaking/safebreaking (Crimes Act 1900 
(NSW) s 114(1)(b)), and being found in a public place with intent to commit an indictable 
offence, having been previously convicted (Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 546b(1)), it has 
intensified with the scale of threats such as terrorism as 
precaution, the basis of the legal principle designed to frame administrative decision-making in 
other fields (notably environmental catastrophes and industrial disasters), has become so 
dominant a mentality for public officials that it has seeped into spheres well beyond those for 
which it was originally intended (Zedner 2009:57–8).  
Under s 101.6(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth), it is an offence carrying a penalty for life 
imprisonment to do ‘any act in preparation for, or planning, a terrorist act’, an offence that 
extends criminal liability further back along the time dimension than the traditional attempt 
formulation, which does not apply to preparatory acts. Further counterterrorism offences in 
Criminal Code (Cth) pt 5.3 div 102 effectively criminalise the very existence of 
organisations on the basis of conduct in which they may engage in the future, extending 
criminal liability beyond that of conspiracy. No specific agreement to commit a specific 
crime is required (McDonald and Williams 2007; and see generally McCulloch and 
Pickering 2009; Hocking 2003). 
These approaches have since been extended to other forms of association such as 
motorcycle clubs or ‘bikie gangs’ in both New South Wales and South Australia (Lynch 
2009). In New South Wales, the Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control) Act 2009 (NSW) 
was passed two weeks after the bashing death of a Hells Angel’s member at Sydney airport. 
Both the New South Wales and South Australian legislation have been subject to 
constitutional challenge, in both cases successfully (South Australia v Totani; Wainohu v 
New South Wales). Among the significant aspects of these decisions is that the categories of 
incompatibility and repugnancy originally outlined in Kable, where the High Court struck 
down a New South Wales Act providing for the continued post-sentence detention of one 
man, are open to further development in relation to specific legislation, and are linked to 
procedural fairness (see also Lane and Morrison; Kirk v IRC). 
Implications for a normative theory of the criminal law 
What implications, if any, do these features of recent criminalisation practice in New South 
Wales, some of them commonplace, suggest for the project of developing a ‘normative 
theory of criminal law’? The first feature was the absence of concern for legal principle in 
much political, media and legislative criminalisation activity, and the second the conduct of 
that activity under the banner of the politics of law and order and the frame of penal 
populism. From a philosophical or jurisprudential perspective this is a cause for regret, but 
primarily illustrates the importance of the task of constituting a set of normative principles 
against which the current political practice can be contrasted. For those working within a 
criminological or socio-legal tradition, the absence of reference to principles in relation to 
both the limits of criminal law and its formulation and content, and the overriding political 
impetus of law and order populism, become key conditions of existence that need to be 
analysed. The aim is to shift them as much as is possible as part of a strategy of attempting 
to develop a more principled approach to criminalisation around a set of principles (such as 
 those promoted by Andrew Ashworth) that might attract some broader political and legal 
support. Hence the importance of discussion such as that entered into by Nicola Lacey in 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma, addressing the conditions under which the ‘strategic capacity for 
co-ordination necessary to resolve the collective action problem posed by the politicisation 
of criminal justice is lacking’ (Lacey 2008). Among Lacey’s suggestions here, for example, 
are promoting bipartisan political approaches and attempting to revalorise expert opinion 
(Lacey 2008:190–6). Other contributions include Ian Loader’s work on the diminishing 
influence of ‘expertise’ (Loader 2006) and Loader and Richard Sparks on the various modes 
of criminological engagement in their Public Criminology? (Loader and Sparks 2011). 
Another is Russell Hogg’s call for a decoupling of populism and punitiveness and a 
discussion of how to de-pathologise populism and treat it as normal dimension of politics 
(Hogg 2012).  
In relation to the third feature, process changes — particularly in areas such as the 
extension of police powers and the emergence of bail as a realm of unacknowledged 
preventive detention, a back-door criminalisation on the basis of risk of future offending, 
conducted prior to trial, the due process and fair trial-oriented principles (embodied, for 
example, in international conventions or in local human rights legislation such as the Human 
Rights Act 2004 (ACT) and the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 
(Vic) or in implied constitutional rights or common law principles (see, for example, R v 
Benbrika)) — provide a basis for critique, opposition and redress. As does the recent 
NSWLRC Report on Bail (2012), which places the whole debate over bail on the 
foundational principles of the right to personal liberty; the presumption of innocence; no 
detention without legal cause; no punishment without conviction by due process; a fair trial; 
individualised justice and consistency in decision-making; and special provision for young 
people (NSWLRC 2012:ch 2). The attempt is to return bail to its rightful place as a 
mechanism for ensuring the integrity of the criminal trial process, rather than a free-floating 
forum for crime prevention and ‘community protection’. The New South Wales government 
has not adopted the key NSWLRC recommendation of a return to a presumption in favour 
of bail for all offences, preferring instead a ‘unacceptable risk’ test. However, the Bill 
requires that ‘a regard … be had to the presumption of innocence and the general right to be 
at liberty’ (Bail Bill 2013 (NSW) s 3) and adopts other recommendations intended to reduce 
the denial of bail and the rise in bail revocations brought about through excessive use of bail 
conditions and increased police monitoring. 
On the fourth feature, the use of criminal penalties in regulatory fields, the expansion of 
civil, administrative and contractual hybrids and blending and blurring, one response might 
be an attempt to sharpen the processes of boundary definition by arguing, as Husak does, for 
a radical confinement of the criminal sanction to serious harms that are wrongful, and for 
which punishment is deserved, which involve a specified, legitimate and substantial state 
interest that has some prospect of being achieved, and is no more extensive than necessary 
to achieve its aims (Husak 2008). For the sceptics who think this is unlikely to happen, 
especially given that, on the figures for 2008 in New South Wales, regulatory Acts featuring 
criminal penalties outnumbered conventional criminal law subject matter three to one, the 
task might be more one of following the twists and turns in the regulatory trail or ‘sweeping 
across the disciplines’, as Braithwaite puts it (2000:63), testing the justifications for 
choosing particular forms of regulation and the specific processes, techniques and effects, 
against a more open, flexible and eclectic set of criteria or principles that might differ in 
different fields, while retaining a strong commitment to procedural justice and a watchful 
eye on its abrogation under whatever label or hybrid. 
Attempts to grapple with the proliferation of statutory, regulatory and hybrid offences 
and the blending and blurring tendencies are not assisted by what Leader-Elliott calls the 
‘concentric’ structure of criminal law (evident in Duff’s Answering for Crime (2007) and 
central to most normative theory), where intentional offences against a person, such as 
homicide and rape, lie at the core of criminal law, exercising a ‘gravitational pull’ over the 
lesser offences founded in recklessness and negligence, most of which are statutory (an 
approach that mirrors the traditional ‘general’ and ‘specific’ division of criminal law). 
Leader-Elliott argues, similarly to the challenge earlier in this paper to conceiving criminal 
law as a unitary object or field, that ‘the criminal law is polycentric, rather than concentric: a 
loose federation rather than a unitary state’ (Leader-Elliott 2010:55). The implication of this 
for normative theory is, he suggests, that the ‘discovery and development of a principled set 
of legislative limits or constraints requires careful consideration of the history and 
conventions of legislative practice over a broad and representative range of statutory 
criminal offences’ (Leader-Elliott 2010:65).  
As for the increasing emphasis on pre-emption, pre-crime and precaution, resistance can 
be mobilised on various bases. One is to defend existing common law conceptions of the 
legitimate limits of inchoate or preparatory crimes, requiring traditional notions of proximity 
to a completed offence in order to allow for changes of mind or to prevent capturing people 
who had other non-criminal purposes in mind. Another traditional common law principle 
that can be invoked is to insist on the requirement of intent to bring about, or subjective 
recklessness as to, consequences; that is, actual intent to cause, or awareness of, the 
consequences of actions.  
A more focused normative argument is that of Bronnitt and Gani, who argue more 
generally that ch 2 of the Criminal Code (Cth), containing the principles of criminal 
responsibility:  
should be given a real constitutional role in the criminal law by incorporating clear statements 
of the priority and significance attached to the fundamental principles of criminal 
responsibility. Under the current framework, the fundamental principles upon which our 
criminal law has developed can be derogated from in the interests of law and order, with the 
attendant danger that illiberal exceptions of strict and absolute liability will become the general 
rule. Rather than prospectively enabling such derogations, Ch 2 should provide a set of 
normative parameters for criminalisation which, when exceeded, trigger judicial competence 
to review the fairness of imposing particular forms of criminal liability in particular contexts 
(Bronnitt and Gani 2009:259). 
A further defence is constitutional challenge on grounds such as proved successful in 
Totani and Wainohu: that there are constitutional limits to the processes, procedures and 
decisions in which criminal legislation can require courts exercising judicial power under 
the rule of law to engage. However, the limits of such reliance can be seen in the very 
prompt passage of an only slightly redrafted Act (Crimes (Criminal Organisation Control) 
Act 2012 (NSW)). 
Conclusion 
While the argument in this article has been mounted from within a criminologically 
influenced criminal law scholarship, critical of the context-free and abstract arguments of 
some legal philosophy, hopefully enough has been said to demonstrate the potential for a 
more criminologically and empirically informed legal philosophy and a more 
philosophically aware and normatively attuned criminological legal scholarship to edge 
 closer together, particularly given the emphasis of leading legal philosophers, like Anthony 
Duff, on the need for a ‘practical philosophy’ that rejects: 
attempts to derive the content of the criminal law from a single master principle ... [and] 
accept[s] that debates about its scope will be more piecemeal, gradual affairs, more focussed 
on particular offences (actual or suggested), and informed by a range of values, presumptions 
and considerations (Duff 2007:142–3; see also Sandel (2009) for an approach to moral 
philosophy as ‘practical wisdom’). 
In a more recent formulation, Duff refers to the search for ‘a single master principle, or set 
of principles, that provides substantive general criteria by which we can identify the types of 
conduct that are in principle criminalizable’ as ‘doomed to failure’ (Duff 2012:16). Such 
formulations potentially bring the two traditions closer together, particularly if the 
‘considerations’ include empirical studies derived from criminological and socio-legal work, 
rather than considerations solely internal to moral or legal philosophy.  However, there is 
still a substantial gap between the two traditions, which cannot be glossed over. According 
to Duff: 
The processes of criminalization are those processes through which conduct comes to be or to 
be treated as criminal. My concern here is not with how those processes actually operate (that 
would be a complicated, messy, often depressing story, based on historical, sociological, 
psychological and political evidence), but with how they should operate: with what 
considerations should guide people in deliberating over whether to criminalize or not; and in 
particular, how — at what stages, in what ways — considerations about the moral 
wrongfulness of potentially criminalizable types of conduct should figure in such 
deliberations. More precisely still, my concern is with the logic rather than with the 
chronology of criminalization processes: not with the ways in which or times at which such 
considerations are actually adverted to in deliberations about criminalization, but in the proper 
logical structure of the deliberations that could justify criminalization (2012:7). 
The very things that Duff is decidedly not concerned with in that article, and that are largely 
avoided in the whole normative project — those ‘complicated, messy, often depressing’ 
stories, based on ‘historical, sociological, psychological and political evidence’ — are at the 
heart of the contextual project. They cannot be bracketed out in order to create a clean and 
tidy realm where logic can roam untainted, except in the course of some purely 
philosophical exercise. For logic only takes us so far, particularly in a field as expressive as 
criminal law. While the ‘should’ focus is seductive, enlightening — even inspirational — it 
must ultimately be related in some way to the ‘what is’ and ‘why’, not least so that some 
routes can be charted towards the ‘should’. Those routes need to start from somewhere 
approximating where we are, as best we can divine, and confront the ‘messy’ terrain 
mapped out by the ‘contextual’ approach to criminalisation and criminal law scholarship.  
Criminal law is unavoidably normative in character in the sense that it is a major site of 
moral politics and moral enterprise in which the contest over values and symbolism is 
frequently more important than instrumental considerations, such as: Does it deter? Thus, 
for example, arguments about crime reduction, the criminogenic effects of penal excess, and 
so on, rarely trump symbolic and expressive appeals. Normative debates and contestation 
are thus central to ‘context’, and this is perhaps something that needs to be taken more 
seriously.  
On the other hand, the normative arguments in question do not refer to a body of abstract 
principles or theory. This implies, as Michael Sandel (2009) argues, that moral philosophy 
needs to be brought down from its Olympian heights and reconceived as an outgrowth and 
refinement of civic debate if it is to play a meaningful role in the politics of criminal law. 
The implication of this is that a normative theory of criminal law as a stand-alone entity is 
likely to have limited purchase where criminal law is integral to wider moral and cultural 
politics. 
While there has been a tendency throughout this article to run together the separate 
considerations of the appropriate justifications for criminalisation, or the limits of criminal 
law, on the one hand, and the appropriate principles governing the formulation of particular 
criminal offences, on the other, there has been one thread common to both considerations 
and to both criminological and philosophical approaches, which might usefully be placed to 
the fore. It is the emphasis on procedural justice principles: due process, the right to a fair 
trial, the presumption of innocence, and on traditional legal notions of the separation of 
powers, judicial independence and the rule of law. Of course, such notions beg numerous 
questions as to their exact content and application and invite scepticism that they are more 
honoured in discourse than in practice, celebrated in abstract while being denied 
applicability in the individual instance. Due process can tend to devote too much attention to 
form rather than substance (see, for example, Stuntz 2011). Nevertheless, such notions are 
sufficiently recognised, at least in formulation, to be embodied in many international 
conventions and many domestic legal frameworks. They have a currency, a purchase in 
legal, political and popular discourse, that sophisticated discussions of the ‘harm principle’ 
or other supposedly ‘foundational’ principles do not. And, as has been argued here, 
procedural justice principles are not ‘merely’ procedural; rather, they are intimately linked 
to and partly constitutive of substantive criminal law, both as it is formulated and as it is 
enforced and practised. 
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